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We constructed a three-party market in which experts, non-experts, and insurers 
negotiated with each other for services, insurance coverage, and cash in such a way that 
we could observe prices over successive rounds of negotiations and determine whether or 
not they showed inflationary tendencies. We used agent-based software to execute the 
experiment. We found that three-party transactions among insurers, experts, and 
nonexperts showed inflationary tendencies, but two-party transactions between experts 
and non-experts did not. The findings suggested that institutional sources of price 
inflation can exist on the basis of the order of negotiations when there is an intermediary 
between consumer and supplier. The findings are consistent with a theoretical argument 
by Frech and Ginsburg (1975) showing that medical insurance reimbursement systems 
with certain price-control characteristics caused chronic price inflation 
 
 
FRECH AND GINSBURG 
 
Frech and Ginsburg (1975) analyzed a model in which health insurance induces 
chronic inflation. In the model, medical providers agreed with insurers to furnish unlimited 
services at rates set according to a survey of “usual and customary” fees within a geographic 
region. The policy paid a level of reimbursement equivalent to some percentile in the 
distribution, usually between the 75th and 90th percentile. Frech and Ginsburg then showed that 
by fixing the fees in the short run, the insurer set off a chain of events that caused prices paid by 
consumers to rise until the market was saturated. The speed of the increases depended on the 
percentile of the distribution chosen and the frequency of revision of the prevailing rates.1
 
“When fee schedules are set by a prevailing rate mechanism, certain plausible 
assumptions give rise to a chronic inflation in the fee schedule, with the rate depending on how 
often the schedule is adjusted and the percentile in the fee distribution chosen as the prevailing 
rate. This inflation only ends when consumers of medical care reach saturation,” Frech and 
Ginsburg concluded. 
                                                 
*  Corresponding author address: Carl A. Johnston, Ph.D. student, Interdisciplinary Center for 
Economic Science, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, MSN 1B2, Fairfax, VA 22030; 
dcjohnst@earthlink.net. 
1  It is frequently argued that medical price inflation has not historically been driven by price increases for existing 
procedures. “The main reason healthcare is continuing to absorb a larger share of the economy is innovation: that 
the range of things that medicine can do keeps increasing” (McClellan, heart study, Cutler et al. 2001). 
Procedures not covered by insurance include Lasik, dentistry, and cosmetic procedures. 
  An alternative possibility is that in an industry characterized by technological innovation, prices for existing 
procedures should decline in real terms. Therefore, the stable appearance of medical prices might mask a 
tendency for prices to be much higher than they would be in a more transparent market. 2 
 
Frech and Ginsburg also showed that fixed-fee payments (conceptually similar to 
diagnostic related group payments currently used by Medicare) were less inflationary than 
reasonable and customary fees described above but were still inflationary. Since the fixed 
payments were also based on a percentile of a distribution of prevailing rates, the mechanics of 





The Frech-Ginsburg model assumed that health care providers charged fees for their 
services subject to conventional assumptions about utility of services and income to consumers 
and provider costs. The model assumed that some health care consumers had a health insurance 
policy that paid an indemnity i when the insured consumer suffered an illness that initially cost 
0 t  to treat. The cost of the treatment could be described as a function of i and some premium 
function of services consumed, p: 
P
 
  0 () t Pi p x = + ,  
 
where p is the premium that could be charged in addition to the indemnity depending on the level 
of service provided x. The model assumed that 0 . Therefore, when (ok?)  0 tj t 0, ( ) 0 t Pp x >> P P >  
and it is assumed that the level of i is set according to an average of previous period prices, the 
insurer sets the price for period  tj at the previously prevailing market price  . The price for the 
next market period then becomes 
P 0 t P
 
  0 () tj t PPp x = + .  
 
The authors claimed the price of the service would continue to rise until the market became 
saturated. (Frech and Ginsburg 1975).  
 
We can examine Frech’s and Ginsburg’s basic claim by simulating an environment in 
which negotiations proceed in a fixed order. The order of negotiation then forms the framework 





In our simulation, as in Figure 1, negotiations between agent types over commodities 
occur in a fixed sequence. First, insurer and non-expert exchange cash (Cash 1) for coverage 
(Coverage 1). Next, expert and non-expert exchange coverage (Coverage 2) for services. Finally, 





Each of the non-experts was assigned an initial level of cash. Experts had an initial stock 
of services to sell, and insurers had an inventory of coverage. Each agent type also had 
preferences over each commodity. Non-experts preferred to own services, which they could only 












FIGURE 1  Three-party trading system with insurer 
 
 
In the first set of transactions, insurers negotiated with non-experts for premiums (thereby 
pre-setting a constraint on any later transactions involving insurance coverage). Later 
transactions with insurance must be less than the value of the insurance coverage premium 
(Cash 1) and also less than the amount of coverage traded for the premium (Coverage 1). Each 
leg of the transaction was bound by the previous set of negotiations. Therefore, Cash 2 was 
constrained by Cash  1. Coverage  3 was constrained by Coverage  2, which, in turn, was 
constrained by Coverage 1. The amount of services provided to the non-expert could not exceed 
reimbursements to the expert (Cash 2). In each leg, both parties were assumed to trade in a fair 
manner, meaning that the value of coverage is at least as valuable as the cash tendered in return. 
Likewise, services and coverage traded between expert and non-expert have comparable value. 
The full set of constraints is laid out in Figure 1. The outcome of the completed negotiation 
round constrains the next round of negotiations. 
 
 
Bargaining Rules and Price Formation 
 
Exchange was accomplished by bilateral barter between agents at mutually-agreed-upon 
prices by using a posted offer mechanism. Each set of negotiations was subject to its own set of 
constraints. All constraints, in turn, were dependent on the outcome of previous negotiations, as 
outlined in Figure 2. 
 
The constraints were not violated when the amount of services corresponded exactly to 
the amount of coverage purchased at an exchange rate of one unit of coverage for each unit of 
cash. However, because the exchange rate between coverage and services is only constrained and 
not fixed by the initial negotiation (between insurer and non-expert), we can see that the expert 
can profit by undersupplying services for a given amount of coverage. Likewise, insurers can 



















































FIGURE 2  Constraints on three-party trading system 
 
 
exchange for cash. If each agent takes advantage of the profit opportunities afforded it by the 
order of negotiation, then the value of coverage will steadily devalue relative to cash, resulting in 
inflated prices for services.  
 
The continuous devaluation of the value of coverage throughout the order of the 
negotiations accounted for the price inflation that Frech and Ginsburg postulate. This also gave 
some extra justification for Frech’s and Ginsburg’s claim that the rate of inflation depended in 
part on how often fee schedules are adjusted (how many attempts are made in each cycle) within 





In this paper, we take a well-known agent-based computer simulation model, the zero-
intelligence trader, and modify it to accommodate transactions between three types of agents. 
Gode and Sunder demonstrated that zero-intelligence trader could simulate transactions between 
different types of agents with heterogeneous preferences over different objects. Gode and Sunder 
(1993) showed that this procedure used in the context of a multi-agent program produced price 
and efficiency results that were comparable to those generated by a laboratory double auction, as 





Although there is an established body of literature for multi-agent “zero-intelligence” 
bargaining, published accounts typically discuss environments with only two types or one type of 
agent (buyers, sellers, or buyer-sellers). It is simple to alter this existing program environment 
designed for two types of agents and to add a third agent to it. The three types of agents in the 
redesigned ZITrader are insurers, experts, and non-experts. Experts and non-experts can be 
thought of as generic representations of doctors and patients. The three types of agents then use 
the ZI Trader activation methodology to trade three quantities: cash, services, and coverage.  
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Agents are assigned an initial endowment of cash, coverage, and services. (Non-experts 
have cash; experts have services; insurers have coverage). We also give each agent preferences 
over each good, such that non-experts desire services; experts desire cash, and insurers want 
coverage. The preference for coverage is always relatively low relative to each agent’s desire for 





We use an algorithm for representing preferences borrowed from sugar and spice trader 
in order to endogenously set marginal preferences of agents over commodities on the basis of 
their holdings. Specifically, Axtell-Epstein showed how agents can be programmed with Cobb-
Douglas preferences over objects. We extend this model slightly by adding a third term to the 
Cobb-Douglas multipliers. The program then randomly activates agents and assigns them to 
buyer or seller roles depending on which agent has the higher marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) for the given object with respect to the numeraire. Equation set 0.3 shows how to 
determine an agent’s MRS for one good 2 with respect to another good  1. After determining 
respective values of MRS, the program determines a transaction price by calculating the 
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Simulations were attempted by using a Cobb-Douglass function with preferences as 
follows: 
 
 Experts:   
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where X stands for units of insurance coverage, C is cash, and S is services. E stands for expert, 
N for non-expert, and I for insurer. 
                                                 
2   In each case, we also assign a very small amount of nonpreferred quantities to each agent, and we also give each 
agent a small amount of value for nonpreferred commodities. In this way, we avoid the problem of Cobb-
Douglas functions when they begin a round with zero inventory of a traded commodity that has zero preference, 
thus forcing a division by zero error. 6 
 
ORDER OF NEGOTIATIONS 
 
The main program’s code can be altered to contain subroutines that control how each 
agent would be randomly activated and made to trade with each other agent type. By sequencing 
the order in which the subroutines are called, one can simulate the desired order of negotiations. 
By repeatedly calling the routines in order, one can then simulate several rounds of negotiations. 
 
The program calls subroutines in a specific order. First, non-experts and insurers trade 
cash for coverage. Then non-experts and experts trade coverage for services. Finally, insurers 
and experts trade coverage for cash. High-MRS buyers are matched with low-MRS sellers, and 
the two agents trade as described above. Trades are recorded and statistically analyzed by a 
standard data agent routine, also modified from the ZITrader program.  
 
The number of attempts made to trade is a parameter in the program. In the simulations 
described here, the program makes 50 attempts to find qualifying buyers and sellers. The number 
of attempts is important to the exercise. Making a large number of attempts would satiate 
non-expert demand for coverage and thereby end the market process in the first round. Frech-
Ginsburg, however, implies that rounds occur at a frequency such that market demand cannot be 
satiated in one round. Therefore, the program discussed here limits the number of potential 
transactions to 50, ensuring that demand is not satiated in the first round. The program executes 
the cycle of negotiations four times. By trial and error, we discovered this is the number of 
rounds required to exhaust the bulk of gains from trade. 
 
 
Purpose of the Simulation 
 
The purpose is to prove the feasibility of a test of the Frech-Ginsburg theory of inflation 





The agents bargained with each other as explained above. Agents were randomly activated, and 
trade attempts were made. The software generated 50 of each type of agent, and each agent type 
was assigned the same number (5) of some initial stock of tradable commodity as well as tiny 
amounts of the other two tradable commodities. For example, non-experts had an initial stock of 
5 units of cash; however, they also had initial stocks of 0.1 unit of coverage and 0.1 unit of 
services in order to avoid dividing by zero when conducting initial trades. The experts and non-
experts were similarly furnished with initial stocks of services and coverage, respectively, as 
well as de minimis amounts of the other two commodities. For the reasons discussed earlier, 
trade attempts were limited to 50. 
 
 
What We Learned from the Experiment 
 
The simulation established that the trading scheme does produce many of the kinds of 
imbalances that one might expect it to show given our discussion earlier. Prices for services 













































































FIGURE 3  Average prices and variances from agent-based simulation 
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decreasing trend over time, even as prices of insurance coverage go up. A progressive 
devaluation of the “currency” of insurance coverage seems evident. Inflation in the prior period 





This version of the software produces extraordinarily large variances in prices and steep 
gains in prices from one period to the next (and steep reimbursement declines for the expert in 
the coverage-for-cash leg). The large variances are related to the initial trades in which there are 





A counterfactual experiment, in which two parties trade and are found to create no 
inflation, would be the best way to verify the claim that the three-party institutional negotiation 
order causes the price inflation. If inflation occurs in the three-party structure but not in the 
two-party structure that is otherwise identical to the three-party experiment, then we can justify 
the claim that it was the procedure of negotiation and nothing else that caused the observed price 
increases. 
 
The counterfactual experiment is easy to carry out. In order to turn the simulation into a 
two-party experiment, we simply place two slash marks in front of the lines that call for cash-for-
coverage and coverage-for-cash routines, and we allow only the coverage-for-services routine to 
execute four times. The full findings are summarized in Table 2 and presented at length in 
Exhibit 3 at the end of this paper. need callouts for exhibits 1 and 2 too 
 
 
TABLE 2  Counterfactual experiment results 
 
 
Coverage for Services 
Parameter 
 
Round 1  Round 2  Round 3  Round 4 
      
Average  0.63180726  0.482374001 0.399636988 0.43643578 
S.D.  0.100377281 0.170497875 0.195787679 0 
 
 
The prices in the counterfactual experiment do not violate the notion that they all come 
from the same distribution and therefore no discernible inflation trend is visible. This is a sharp 




WHY HUMAN EXPERIMENTS ARE NEEDED 
 
This paper has demonstrated two different theoretical models and two sets of computer 
simulations that complement each other in terms of enforcing our understanding of how inflation 9 
 
generated by institutional sources would work and what such price inflation would look like and 
under what circumstances it might occur. The findings suggest that not only is such an effect 
possible, but it appears to be robust. 
 
On the other hand, introduction of humans into the mechanism might change the 
dynamics significantly. For example, if non-experts withhold demand or if experts sell their 
services at less than their value, it might have a dampening effect on prices and possibly even 
create an (inefficient) equilibrium. Therefore, a replication of the simulation described in this 
paper but using humans instead of agents might yield valuable information about how human-





The health care sector draws in more and more resources each year. Medicare cost 
escalation is thought to be a significant threat to the financial stability of the United States. 
Rising health care costs are among the most frequently cited causes of job destruction. Yet 
despite accelerating costs, we have little to show for the expense, since health indicators have not 
improved much in 30+ years. The proportion of persons without health insurance, infant death 
rates, and male life expectancy have not improved as much as one might have hoped, given the 
vast resources being expended on the problem. Yet the most recent scholarship on the causes of 
inflation in health care dismiss the notion that inflationary pricing contributes to the escalation of 
health care costs. For example, McClellan et al. (2001) studied the cost of heart attack treatment. 
and concluded that “spending increases are mostly driven by changes in the quantity and type of 
services provided, not changes in the price of a given service.” 
 
These findings have given rise to a discussion about how to curb the demand for greater 
intensity of treatment for diseases, such as heart attacks. One academic/policymaker has gone so 
far as to suggest outright that limitations on the amount of profit that developers of innovative 
medical products can make on new inventions constitute the best way to reign in runaway costs 
(presentation at George Mason University in February 2005 by Tomas J. Philipson, The 
University of Chicago, former Assistant Commissioner of Medicare). 
 
It is not usually the case that technical innovations present these kinds of problems. 
Usually, the technical advance produces deflation. For example, computers are much more 
capable and much more numerous in 2005 than they were in 1980. Yet nobody thinks of 
computing costs as being out of control. This is because in fields characterized by innovation, it 
is common to see prices decline, sometimes sharply. If we were still paying the same price for a 
1985 microprocessor in 2005, or a little less, we might consider it a bad trade. 
 
Therefore, the fact that prices of old medical technologies remain stable or decline a bit 
does not necessarily mean that prices are behaving in a noninflationary way. The work in this 
report is intended to suggest that institutional sources of price inflation can exist on the basis of 
the order of negotiations, particularly when there is an intermediary between consumer and 
supplier. The simulations and theoretical work show that experimental methods could be used to 
explore behavioral, institutional, and economic system design that would substantially benefit 
our understanding of these kinds of situations. 
 10 
 
One can also imagine many extensions of these experiments. For example, could we 
design a market for insurance claims that might moderate the apparent inflationary tendency 
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2 Universal Mark-up Language (UML) description of three-way trader 
 
cd insuredexpertisetrader EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregiste e  Trial Vers red Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregister d ion   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unr
NonExpert Expert
+  cash:  double
+  coverage:  double
+  services:  double
+ cash:    double
+ coverage:    double
+  services:  double
+ NonExpert()
+  MRS_nonexpert_coverage_cash() : double
+ MRS_nonexpert_coverage_services()  :  double
+ Expert()
+  MRS_expert_coverage_services() : double
+  MRS_expert_cash_coverage() : double e
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Tria   nregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unr l Version   EA 5.0 U e
EA 5.0 Unregistered Tria   0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unr l Version   EA 5. e
EA 5.0 Unregistered Tria   l Version   EA 5.0 Unr l Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Tria e
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 U rial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Tr a    EA 5.0 Unr nregistered T i l Version e
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unregistered Trial Version   EA 5.0 Unre
Data
-  N:  int
- min:    double
-  max:  double
- sum:    double
-  sum2:  double
+ Data()
+ AddDatuum(double)  :  void
+  GetN() : int
+ GetMin()  :  double
+ GetMax()  :  double
+ GetAverage()  :  double
+  GetVariance() : double
+  GetStdDev() : double
+ Zero()  :  void
~nonexpert ~expert
InsuredExpertTrader
~  verboseOutput:  boolean = true
~  numberOfinsurers:  int = 50
~  numberOfExperts:  int = 50
~  numberOfNonExperts:  int = 50
~  maxNumberOfTries:  int = 50
~  Services:  double = 5.0
~  Coverage:  double = 5.0
~  Cash:  double = 5.0
~  insurer:  Insurer ([numberOfinsurers]) = new Insurer[num...
~  expert:  Expert ([numberOfExperts]) = new Expert[numb...
~  nonexpert:  NonExpert ([numberOfNonExperts]) = new NonExpert[n...
~ Transactions:    Data
+ InsuredExpertTrader()
+ CashforCoverage()  :  void
+  CoverageforServices() : void
+ CoverageforCash()  :  void
+ main(String[])  :  void
~Transactions ~insurer
Insurer
+  cash:  double
+ coverage:    double
+  services:  double
+ Insurer()
+ MRS_insurer_coverage_cash()  :  double
+ MRS_insurer_cash_coverage()  :  double
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EXHIBIT 1  Multi-agent simulation of three-party experiments 
 
Original Distribution of Coverage, Cash, Services 
 
NonExpert  /  0/  250/  0 
 
Insurer  /  250/  0/  0 
 
Expert  /  0/  0/  250 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  25/  125/  0 
 
Insurer  /  225/  125/  0 
 
Expert  /  0/  0/  250 
 
Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  9/  125/  37 
 
Insurer  /  225/  125/  0 
 
Expert  /  1/  0/  213 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  9/  125/  37 
 
Insurer  /  225/  96/  0 
 
Expert  /  1/  29/  213 
 
Totals  /  235/  317/  250 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  21/  65/  37 
 
Insurer  /  213/  156/  0 
 
Expert  /  1/  29/  213 
 
Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  8/  65/  69 
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Insurer  /  213/  156/  0 
 
Expert  /  9/  29/  181 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  8/  65/  69 
 
Insurer  /  219/  135/  0 
 
Expert  /  6/  48/  181 
 
Totals  /  233/  335/  250 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  16/  25/  69 
 
Insurer  /  211/  175/  0 
 
Expert  /  6/  48/  181 
 
Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  8/  25/  95 
 
Insurer  /  211/  175/  0 
 
Expert  /  13/  48/  155 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  8/  25/  95 
 
Insurer  /  220/  161/  0 
 
Expert  /  5/  58/  155 
 
Totals  /  233/  347/  250 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  12/  5/  95 
 
Insurer  /  216/  181/  0 
 
Expert  /  5/  58/  155 
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Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  5/  5/  110 
 
Insurer  /  216/  181/  0 
 
Expert  /  6/  58/  140 
 
Distribution after trading Coverage for Cash 
 
NonExpert  /  5/  5/  110 
 
Insurer  /  221/  170/  0 
 
Expert  /  4/  69/  140 
 
Totals  /  230/  345/  250 
 
 




Coverage for Cash    Services for Coverage    Cash for Coverage 
 
 
1st Period  2nd Period  3rd Period    1st Period  2nd Period  3rd Period    1st Period  2nd Period  3rd Period 
                  
Avg 9.438798  118.7625  278.5622   0.442944  1.058568 2.176739   4.970369  3.630569 1.738485 
Var  0  10203.68 18964.91   0.086874  0.894776 2.377667   18.5324  28.83809 1.548212 
 
 
EXHIBIT 3                   This Entire exhibit needs to be removed 
 
Original Distribution of Coverage, Cash,/ Services 
 
NonExpert  /  0/  250/  0 
 
Insurer  /  250/  0/  0 
 
Expert  /  0/  0/  250 
 
Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  0/  250/  31 
 
Insurer  /  250/  0/  0 
 
Expert  /  0/  0/  219 
 
/n Stats after trading Coverage for Services: 31 transactions took place at 
0.6318072598177861 average price; 0.10037728051751019 standard deviation. /n) 
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Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  0/  250/  44 
 
Insurer  /  250/  0/  0 
 
Expert  /  0/  0/  206 
 
/n Stats after trading Coverage for Services: 13 transactions took place at 
0.4823740008931712 average price; 0.17049787522922566 standard deviation. /n) 
 
Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  0/  250/  49 
 
Insurer  /  250/  0/  0 
 
Expert  /  0/  0/  201 
 
/n Stats after trading Coverage for Services: 5 transactions took place at 
0.399636988045828 average price; 0.19578767907593872 standard deviation. /n) 
 
Update Distribution after Trading Coverage for Services 
 
NonExpert  /  0/  250/  50 
 
Insurer  /  250/  0/  0 
 
Expert  /  0/  0/  200 
 
/n Stats after trading Coverage for Services: 1 transactions took place at 0.4364357804719847 
average price; 0.0 standard deviation. /n) 
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